工资风险分担法律模式的比较、厘清与路径选择

Model of Wage Risk Sharing: Comparison, Clarifi cation and Path Selection

摘要:

针对产能必须下降、劳工工时必须减少、企业成本负担必须减少的典型风险，我国理论界已形 成在社会法领域探索建立工资风险分担机制的共识，但具体应采取何种社会保障措施对劳资双方的工资减损予 以填补，当前并无定论。研究发现，社会保险、社会救助、社会补偿的构成法理各有不同，比较法上存在有效 配置不同社会保障措施，进而实现稳定就业目的的有益经验。研究建议，我国应突破以单独的社会保险或社会 补偿手段因应工资风险的思维，采取以社会保险为主、社会救助和社会补偿为辅的工资风险分担法律模式。以 劳动者是否参保为界限，优先通过社会保险基金填补参保劳动者的工资减损，通过社会救助基金帮扶未参保低 收入者，存在政府行政行为影响风险分担时，社会补偿金则发挥兜底作用。

Abstract:

: In response to the typical risks that production capacity has to be declined, labor hours have to be reduced, and the cost burden of enterprises has to be controlled, the theoretical community in China has formed a consensus on exploring the establishment of a wage risk sharing mechanism in the fi eld of social law, but currently there is no consensus on what specifi c social security measures should be taken to fi ll the wage reduction gap for both labor and capital. Research fi nds that there are differences in the legal composition of social insurance, social assistance, and social compensation, and there are benefi cial experiences in effectively allocating different social security measures in comparative law to achieve stable employment goals. The study suggests that China should break through the thinking of responding to wage risks with single social insurance or social compensation means, and adopt a legal model of wage risk sharing with a focus on social insurance supplemented by social assistance and social compensation. Based on whether the worker is insured or not, the priority should be given to using the social insurance fund to fi ll the wage reduction gap of those insured workers, and the lowincome nonparticipants should be assisted through social assistance funds. In addition, when government administrative actions affect risk-sharing, social compensation funds should serve as a safety net.